An optimal eavesdropping strategy for BB84 protocol in quantum cryptography is proposed. This scheme is based on the 'indirect copying'. Under this scheme, eavesdropper can exactly obtain the exchanged information between the legitimate users without being detected.
data can not be compromised unknowingly to the legitimate users of the channel. BB84
protocol [3] is a key distribution protocol over an open channel by quantum phenomena, it relies on the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics to provide key security. The security guarantee is derived from the fact that each bit of data is encoded at random on either one of a conjugate pair of observables of quantum-mechanical object. Because such a pair of observables is subjected to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, measuring one of the observables necessarily randomizes the other.
Although quantum cryptography is provably security, with the quantum key distribution protocols presented, several attacks strategy have been generated, such as intercept/resend scheme [4] , beamsplitting scheme [4] , entanglement scheme [5] [6] [7] and quantum copying [9, 10] . In the intercept/resend scheme, Eve intercepts selected light pulses and reads them in bases of her choosing. When this occurs, Eve fabricates and sends to Bob a pulse of the same polarization as she detected. However, due to uncertainty principle, at least 25% of the pulse Eve fabricates will yield the wrong result if later successfully measured by Bob. The other attack, beamsplitting, depends on the fact that transmitted light pulses are not pure single-photon states. In the entanglement scheme, the eavesdropper involves the carrier particle in an interaction with her own quantum system, referred to as probe, so that the particle and the probe are left in an entangled state, and a subsequent measurement of the probe yields information about the particle. Some investigators are now turning their attention to collective attacks and joint attacks. About these attacks description please see Ref. [8] and its references. Eve can also use the quantum copying to obtain the information between Alice and Bob. Two kind quantum copies are presented [10, 11] . It is appropriate to emphasize the limitation of above attacks strategy. All these mentioned attacks strategy are restricted by the uncertainty principle or the quantum corrections, so Eve can not break the quantum cryptography protocols. The risk of eavesdropper is to disturb the information and finally to be detected by the legitimate users. This is the reason why quantum cryptography is declared to be provably security.
The Eve's aim is to obtain more information from the open channel set up by legitimates user, saying Alice and Bob, and induce more less disturbance on the transmitting quantum bits, so that she can not be detected by the legitimate users Alice and Bob.
In usually, the uncertainty principle or the quantum corrections prevents Eve's attempt from eavesdropping the useful information without being detection. However if Eve can escape the restriction of the uncertainty principle, her attempt will be succeed.
In this paper we propose a novel attack strategy for quantum cryptographic protocols. Under this strategy, the security of BB84 quantum key distribution protocol will completely loss. Alice and Bob without being detected. We call this method as "indirect copying". Of course, It is different from the probabilistic cloning and the inaccurance quantum copying.
Obviously, the "indirect copying" is not a true copy of quantum bits.
II.BB84 quantum key distribution protocol
For describing our attacks strategy, we first review the BB84 protocol. The BB84 protocol is the first key distribution protocol in quantum cryptography. Follows are the protocol in details [12] .
1. Alice prepares a random sequence of photons polarized and sends them to Bob 2. Bob measure his photon using a random sequence of bases 3. Results of Bob's measurements. Some photons are shown as not having been received owing to imperfect detector efficiency. 4 . Bob tells Alice which basis he used for each photon he received.
5. Alice tells him which bases were correct.
6. Alice and Bob keep only the data from these correctly measured photons, discarding all the rest.
7. This data is interpreted as a binary sequence according to the coding scheme:
8. Bob and Alice test their key by publicly choosing a random subset of bit positions and verifying that this subset has the same parity in Bob's and Alice's versions of the key (here parity is odd). If their keys had differed in one or more bit position, this test would have discovered that fact with probability 1/2.
9. Remaining secret key after Alice and Bob have discarded one bit from the chosen subset in step 8, to compensate for the information leaked by revealing its parity.
Step 9 and 10 are repeated k times with k independent random subsets, to certify with probability 1 − 2 −k that Alice's and Bob's keys are the identical, at the cost of reducing the key length by k bits.
10. Distilling the security key by the privacy amplification [13] . The basic principle of privacy amplification is as follows. Let Alice and Bob shared a random variable W , such as a random n-bit string, while an eavesdropper Eve learns a corrected random variable V , providing at most t < n bits of information about W , i.e., H(W |V ) ≤ n − t. Eve is allowed to specify an arbitrary distribution P V W (unknown to Alice and Bob) subject to the only constraint that R(W |V = v) ≤ n − t with high probability (over values v), where R(W |V = v) denotes the second-order conditional Renyi entropy of W , given V = v. For any s < n − t, Alice and Bob can distill r = n − t − s bits of the secret key K = G(W ) while keeping Eve's information about K exponentially small in s , by publicly choosing the compression function G at random from a suitable class of maps into {0, 1} n−t−s .
III. Construction of Reference List
To perform privacy communication between legitimate users, known as Alice and Bob, a set of pre-defined nonorthogonal quantum states or noncommuting quantum states often are used. For briefly, We call this set of pre-defined nonorthogonal quantum state or the noncommuting quantum states as basic quantum states (BQS) in the remainder paper.
Because the BQS are publicly announced by Alice and Bob, Eve can easily get it. In BB84 protocol, the BQS are the four noncommuting states |0 >, | >, respectively, and |u 3 > being perpendicular to u 1 u 2 plane. The relationship between |u i > and basis |e i > is , expanding the BQS by
where
Because the element u ij of matrix U is not a measurable quantity, we square every element of matrix U, and obtain
We sort the element of every row in matrix F from the first column to the final column, and sign it as S(f i1 , f i2 , f i3 ), i = 1, 2, 3, 4, where f ij is the element of matrix F . The sorting value S corresponds a basic quantum state. All these corresponding relationship send by Alice, it seems that Eve 'copies' the Alice's quantum state. However, it is not a real copying, This 'copying' is completely different from the probability and inaccurance copying. We call it as "indirect copying". By this method Eve can measure Alice's signal exactly, and resend an exact copy of it, thereby escaping detection.
Our attack strategy makes the quantum cryptographic protocol at risk. Of course, our scheme can not attack every protocol proposed previously. For example, we can not attack the Ekert protocol [14] , because there is no information encoded there while the particle transits from the source to the legitimate users. In fact, our scheme is only valid for the protocol that quantum state is encoded in transit. Meanwhile, Eve must know the BQS.
In addition, the interval time between two adjacent quantum state of the resent quantum state should almost keep the same as that in Alice's random sequence of quantum bits so that Bob can not feel Eve.
V. Conclusion
In conclusion, we proposed an attack strategy for BB84 key distribution protocol in the quantum cryptography, we called this strategy as 'indirect copying attack'. Under this strategy, the BB84 quantum cryptographic protocols is at risk, the eavesdropper can exactly obtain the information between the legitimate users without being detected. Of course, the presented strategy is only valid for the case that the quantum state is encoded in transit.
